The traditional problem
Saul Kripke is a phenomenon, nothing less, and the discipline of Philosophy is much the better for his contribution to it. My own intellectual development has benefited immeasurably from my association with Kripke. I begin with a pair of quotes from another great contemporary philosopher. Woody Allen said, 'I don't want to achieve immortality through my work; I want to achieve it through not dying'. Like Allen, Kripke will live on through his work long after most of the rest of us are forgotten.
Woody Allen's semi-autobiographical movie, Stardust Memories, includes a brief sketch in which Allen's character says the following: I've never been able to fall in love. I've never been able to find the perfect woman. There's always something wrong. And then I met Doris. A wonderful woman, great personality. But for some reason, I'm just not turned on sexually by her. Don't ask me why. And then I met Rita. An animal, nasty, mean, trouble. And I love going to bed with her. Though afterward I always wished that I was back with Doris. And then I thought to myself, 'If only I could put Doris's This little tragedy raises a host of philosophical issues. The central issues concern the irrational nature of human sexual attraction and romantic love, and the often-troubling relationship between the two. The dialogue raises moral issues about the treatment of people as means rather than as ends in themselves, the objectification and victimization of women, and related issues. The passage also concerns the traditional philosophical problem of the identity of a person through change. With profound apologies to the reader, the present chapter is concerned exclusively with personal identity. I shall argue that the traditional philosophical problem dissolves. Recent discussion has tended to focus on the question of 'what matters' in survival, with less attention paid to the original question of what makes someone the very same person even through change. This may because it is widely believed that strict survival -genuine personal identity -is not what is fundamentally important and not what ought to concern us. Though I remain doubtful that this has been successfully argued, I shall not discuss the issue here. If I am correct, there is a better reason for dismissing the question of what personal identity consists in.
Others before me have rejected the problem of personal identity (or more generally, the problem of the identity of a thing through change) as a pseudo-problem, on the ground that it presupposes the questionable doctrine that a person is constituted by stages (phases, temporal parts), which are supposed to be portions of that person's life history. 1 Once this doctrine is rejected, it is argued, it follows immediately that there is no genuine problem about formulating principles of unification that specify which series of person stages constitute genuine persons, as opposed to gerrymandered non-persons. My objection to the alleged problem of personal identity has virtually nothing to do with this one, which seems to me to be wide of the target. I have no quarrel to make against stages or phases. No doubt much of what has been supposed about them is simply wrong, but that is not sufficient reason to doubt
